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The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and the rapid development of its creative abilities, 
pose the necessary question about of to whom the copyright of these creations is guaranteed 
should be granted. AI's stand-alone programs perform different creative functions that 
result in new copyrightable works, such as composing songs, drawing, or creating new 
paintings. This thesis seeks to answer this question of who the owner of copyright of works 
created by AI should be, and how to apply the solution considering the legal requirements 
for allocating copyright.   
 
Part of the research takes a historical approach to the copyright law and AI. Allocating 
copyright to AI-generated works is a modern challenge faced by legal systems around the 
world. Copyright law has evolved from the first known disputes, through the protection of 
publishers and booksellers in the 17th century, to the romantic discourse of the right of 
author in Europe in the 18th century, to the protection of the right of author and the Statute 
of Anne. The scientific and academic community has come to recognize the creative 
potential of AI, and they have begun to request for legislation. Therefore, the thesis 
employs a qualitative research, that compares and contrasts different contexts and provides 
an analysis of the challenges of granting copyright to AI generated works under the current 
copyright requirements of human creativity and provides considerations about algorithm 
creativity. The legal requirements exclude non-human authorship in most legislations, with 
exception of the United Kingdom (UK). For this reason, the thesis explores the regulation 
regarding non-human authorship and accordingly examines treaties, doctrines, statutory 
copyright laws, and cases that regulate the concept of authorship in the EU, the US, the UK, 
Germany, Colombia, and the gaps in the regulations. 
 
It concludes, that creativity is not only a human characteristic. The algorithmic creativity is 
used by AI for creating new works and represents the social change that must be reflected 
in the law to ensure legal security. Also, the different elements that are part of protectable 
work legislation can be adapted to include the independent creations of AI. However, the 
purpose of copyright protection to encourage innovation by authors is an important and 
exclusively human aspect that goes beyond the technical and ontological aspects of 
creativity. As AI is not encouraged through recognition to create new works, and 
programmers are the direct creators of the program and indirect creators of the final work, 
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1.1 Artificial Intelligence and Copyright 
 
The discipline of law is guided by innovation. The current challenge faced by intellectual 
property law is the difficulty of adapting to the new reality imposed by the accelerated 
advance of technology. This new scenario confronts the world with an intense legal debate, 
forces countries to modify their legislation to adapt to the changes that technology entails. 
One previously unthinkable innovation is the existence of artificial intelligence (AI). This 
term refers to the types of computer systems that demonstrate human characteristics of 
intelligence, such as creativity, learning, intuition and problem solving.1 AI machines think 
and behave humanly or rationally and make lives easier by helping to solve medical, 
security, industrial problems, and others.2   
 
Previously unimaginable notions, such as using AI assistants on cell phones3 or hiring an 
AI attorney,4 are possible today. Some are even common in everyday life. Communication 
and marketing have also changed because of the emergence of social platforms5 that use AI 
systems to provide personalized experiences.6 Numerous transactions are made daily in the 
e-commerce marketplace that uses AI to price discriminate. This is usually regarded as 
desirable, since it often increases the efficiency of the economy.7 The popularity of AI in 
the last decades has also highlighted that human beings are not an exclusive source of 
creativity.  
 
The AI phenomenon has been a notable area of study since its inception in 1956,8 and as it 
has grown, there have been more AI-generated works, without human authorship.9 The first 
work supposedly generated by computer was submitted for copyright registration before 
1965. This event led the Copyright Registry to express concern about the undetermined 
situation of works created with computer assistance.10 Since then the question of how to 
 
 
1 WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, Stanford University, Stanford (California), 
United States of America, March 25 to 27, 1991(World Intellectual Property Organization 1991). 
2 Commission, “Report on Saving Lives: Boosting Car Safety in the EU” COM (2016) 0787 final; Commission, “Artificial Intelligence 
for Europe” COM (2018) 237 final (COMMUNICATION) Commission, “Liability for emerging digital technologies” SWD (2018) 137 
final. 
3 Google assistant (Google) <https://assistant.google.com/intl/de_de/#?modal_active=none>; Siri Apple assistant (Apple) 
<https://www.apple.com/de/siri/> accessed 25 September 2015. 
4 Karen Turner, The law firm Baker Hostetler “hired” Ross, known as the first artificially intelligent attorney (The Washington Post, 16 
May 2016) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legal-
robot/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d1808ca1baef> accessed 25 September 2015. 
5 According to Forbes, most US adults use more than one social medium platform and the most popular are YouTube, Facebook, 
Instagram, Pinterest, Snapchat, LinkedIn, Twitter and WhatsApp; which Social Media Platform Is the Most Popular in the US? (Forbes, 
3 March 2018) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurnane/2018/03/03/which-social-media-platform-is-the-most-popular-in-the-
us/#276c707a1e4e> accessed 20 September 2018. 
6 Jeffrey Dunn, ‘Introducing FBLearner Flow: Facebook's AI backbone’ (Facebook Code, 9 May 2016) <https://code. 
facebook.com/posts/1072626246134461/introducing-fblearner-flow-facebook-s-ai-backbone/> accessed 28 September 2018. 
7 Andrew Odlyzko, “Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet” (2004) 3 The Icfaian Journal of Management 
Research 39. 
8 The Dartmouth Conference organized by John McCarthy and others, C.E. Conference Announcement: A proposal for the Dartmouth 
summer conference on artificial intelligence (Stanford University 1955) <http://stanford.io/1bqrAR1>; James Moor, “The Dartmouth 
College Artificial Intelligence Conference: The Next Fifty years” (2006) 27 (4) AI Magazine. 
9 Kalin Hristov, “Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright dilemma.” (2017) 57(3) IDEA 431. 
10 US Copyright Office, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report of The Register of Copyrights (The Library of Congress, L.C 10-35017, 1966) 5. 





protect this type of works has been a pressing matter.11 Avoiding or postponing regulations 
could have a significant economic, scientific, and cultural impact.  
Artificial intelligence has changed the manner in which society lives. It needs to be 
regulated by law that takes into account the new conditions: new technology forces a 
reassessment of intellectual property law,12 as well as other issues. Copyright is 
continuously modified, re-evaluated, and reinterpreted to adapt to technological changes.13 
 
According to a report of the European Commission about AI, “most developed economies 
recognize the game-changing nature of AI and have adopted different approaches that 
reflect their own political, economic, cultural, and social systems.”14 The Commission 
affirms that in 2016, the government of the US proposed a strategy for dealing with AI and 
invested approximately 970 million euros in the investigation of unclassified AI. China 
hopes as well to have global leadership by 2030, by implementing its “Next Generation 
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.”15 Japan and Canada, have adopted AI strategies 
as well. The Commission also states that large companies in the US and China have 
invested significantly in AI, trying to exploit large amounts of data. Europe is behind these 
countries, with private investments in IA in 2016 totaling between €2.4 and €3.2 billion, 
compared to €6.5 and €9.7 billion in Asia and between €12.1 and €18.6 billion in North 
America.16 
 
It is important to note that civil law jurisdictions use the concept of right of author17 rather 
than the copyright approach used by common law systems. Common law conceives of 
copyright as a unified set of rights.18 Thus, there is no distinction between author’s rights 
proper and neighboring rights19 in this system, and usually offenses to the moral rights of 
authors would be framed as defamation or malicious falsehood. On the contrary, the right 
of author includes moral rights, which civil law systems have vigorously protected, as well 
as economic rights. This allows these systems to grant moral rights to the real creator of the 
work, while recognizing the economic rights of the same author or third parties.  
 
Economic rights include the crucial right to prevent copying, together with other rights such 
as adaption and translation rights and the right to distribute or make the works publicly 
available. There are also rights usually classified as “neighboring rights” because although 
they may be important economically, they are slightly different conceptually from the more 
basic economic rights, and they are not directly associated with authors per se. Finally, 
moral rights include paternity rights, the right of integrity, and the right to withdraw or 
 
 
11 Annemarie Bridy, “Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author.” (2012) 2012 Stan Tech Rev 5. 
12 Davis Randall. Intellectual Property and Software: The Assumptions Are Broken. No. 1328. A.I. Memo. Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 1991. 
13 Darin Glasser, “Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, if Anyone, Do We Reward?” (2001) Duke L & Tech Rev 0024 1. 
14 Commission, “Artificial Intelligence for Europe” COM (2018) 237 final 4. 
15 “Recent announcements include a EUR 1.7 billion AI technology park in Beijing;” Ibid.  
16 “With 1.4 billion mobile phone subscriptions and 800 million internet users – more than the USA and the EU combined – Chinese 
people generate vast amounts of personal data that are used to develop related AI products”; Ibid. 
17 Germany: Urhebergesetz; Colombia: Derecho de autor. 
18 However, moral rights are enshrined in U.K copyright law in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 (c IV). 
19 Daniel Gervais (ed), International Intellectual Property: a handbook of contemporary research (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 332. 










1.2 Hypotheses and Objectives 
 
The purpose of the current thesis is to examine the challenges AI poses to intellectual 
property law, specifically with regard to copyright. This thesis also seeks to determine who 
should be designated as the copyright holder when AI acts autonomously. Finally, this 
paper analyzes a number of existing academics positions and legislative approaches.21 
 
The key problem that needs to be solved is that one basic requirement for holding copyright 
is possessing the legal authorship: this is currently only possible for a human being. 
However, AI is already capable of authoring different artistic works by itself. Starting from 
this issue, the present thesis summarizes six feasible hypothetical circumstances which 
could determine the copyright holder. Specifically, this paper suggests that the law provide 
copyright to one of the following: 
 
• the programmer or developer; 
• the program owner; 
• the program user; 
• both;  
• special categories proposed at the WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Intellectual 
Property Aspects of Artificial Intelligence 
• expert systems as a special and concrete class of computer programs; 
• expert systems as a dual category with characteristics of computer programs and 
databases;  
• the algorithm 
 
Attributing copyright to an algorithm is, however, problematic, since only human beings 
can be copyright holders, not machines. Nevertheless, there is a possibility of a 
nontraditional solution which would imply a copyleft license in which the copyright has no 
holder and the work instead is placed in another category: the public domain. 
 
This thesis starts with the assumption that the fairest solution is to grant copyright 
ownership to the AI developer, the person that invested time and effort to create the 
machine responsible for the creation. This is provided for in the Universal Copyright 
Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.  This legislation protects the innovation 
purpose of copyright granting and recognizes the labor of authors, including programmers, 




21 The thesis will compare legislative positions of USA, the EU, UK, Germany, and Colombia. 
22 Walter v Lane [1900] AC 539. 







The current thesis employs analytical and deductive methodology based on statutory law 
and cases from five different legal systems, the EU, the UK, the US, Germany, and 
Colombia, to expose the differences between these systems and their implications. This 
paper also presents the general conditions for owning copyright in these contexts, which are 
in general the same, because they are based on international treaties, like the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT), the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention. 
The research undertaken by relevant academics and institutions on the topic of AI and 
copyright is also addressed.  These papers are used to determine possible recommendations 
for improving copyright law.  The different theories presented in this paper are analyzed 
from a legal perspective through doctrinal and governmental papers. This makes it possible 
to examine the viability of each proposed solution. 
 
This thesis also questions specific topics of the protection of copyrightable works generated 
by AI and discusses different solutions employed by government jurisdiction. As this is a 
relatively new issue, there is currently very little legal development, with the exception of 
the UK, which covers AI generated works. Nevertheless, scholars have studied possible 
bases for the protection and adjudication of copyright for these types of works since the 
inception of AI: international treaties23 are principally applied and the WIPO discussed two 
new possible ways of AI generated works regulation. The first one suggests that these 
works demand the creation of a special classification and the second one proposes to apply 




This thesis is structured in seven chapters. In the first chapter, the introduction identifies the 
central problem addressed in this research and defines the key objectives. Chapter Two 
presents the background of copyright legislation and provides a historical overview of the 
phenomenon. This chapter explores the legal regulation of authorship and how it reflects 
the specific social and economic circumstances involved. Chapter Three highlights the 
requirements for obtaining copyright protection of a work, and Chapter Four offers an 
overview of AI, addressing its creative capacity and performance in the modern economy. 
Following, Chapter Five analyzes different theories of ownership and presents their 
advantages and disadvantages. Chapter Six summarizes the copyright protection legislation 
in the EU, the US, the UK, Germany, Colombia and describes a number of specific judicial 
cases. These cases primarily concern the topic of originality or disputes about requirements 
of authorship rather than non-human works (with exception of the Naruto monkey case) or 
AI generated authorship. Finally, in the last chapter the conclusion summarize the key 







23 WCT, TRIPS Agreement, Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention. 










Richard Bowker defined Copyright in 1912 as “the right to copy, to make plenty, and to 
multiply copies of those products of the human brain known as literature and art.”24 
However, the concept of copyright, as it is known today, is the result of diverse factors, 
beginning with the invention of the printing press and continuing with the rise of the middle 
class.  
 
The development of copyright is connected to the evolution of the profession of a writer. 
The desire to recognize the profession of writer was the beginning of copyright protection. 
Although legislation initially protected only literary works, its scope gradually expanded to 
other artistic works, including translations, adaptations and arrangements and collections.25 
Copyright development react as well to a number of political, legal, and cultural factors. 
More recently, the technological development, computer programming and the rise of 
enormous databases require a change in the way copyright is defined.   
 
2.1.1 The first known copyright dispute 
 
The first known copyright dispute occurred in Ireland between Saint Columba and Saint 
Finnian, around 560 BC.26 The monk Saint Columba copied a Latin psalter owned by his 
teacher Finnian at Moville,27 that put considerable value in the book. Finnian demanded the 
copy, but Columba refused to give it. Finnian then asked Dermott, the King of Ireland, who 
issued an edict in Finnian's favor by arguing that "to every cow belong its calf, so to every 
book belong its copy.”28 According to Bowker, the decision shows that in ancient times 
there was a sense of copyright and that different texts of the same work were compared to 
obtain a standard text. The multiplication of copies of these texts became the basis of a 
publishing and book trade. Arbitration failed, and Sant Columba’s Psalter passed to the 
O’Donnell’s.29  
 
Legend says this dispute gave rise to the battle of Cúl in 561 A.D. (also known as the Battle 
of the Book),30 that caused the death of more than 3.000 people, after which Columba was 
 
 
24 Richard R Bowker, Copyright Its History and Its Law Being A Summary Of The Principles And Practice Of Copyright With Special 
Reference To The American Code Of 1909 And The British Act Of 1911 (Houghton Mifflin Company 1912). 
25 Art 2 of the Berne Convention. 
26 Orla O’Donovan, 'The commons, the Battle of the Book and the cracked enclosures of academic publishing' (2014) 49 (1) Oxford 
University Press and Community Development Journal i21 <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsu021> accessed 7 November 2018. 
27 Andrew Ó Baoill, The True Significance of the World’s First Copyright Ruling in Its Context and for Contemporary Debate on 
Intellectual Property, <https://funferal.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2005/03/firstcopyrightcase.pdf> accessed 25 December 2018. 
28 Every copy of a book belonged to the owner of the original book. 
29 “Royal Irish Academy - Acadamh Ríoga Na HÉireann: Sciences, Humanities and Social Sciences” (The Cathach / The psalter of St 
Columba) <https://web.archive.org/web/20140702153948/http:/www.ria.ie/Library/Special-Collections/Manuscripts/Cathach.aspx> 
accessed 15 December 2018. 
30 No data records were found, which is why it is a legend. 





exiled Iona in 563 A.D. He is today recognized as Saint Columcille and a patron saint of 
bookbinders.31 
 
2.1.2 The printing press 
 
Although printing had existed for centuries,32 around 1440, Gutenberg invented the printing 
press. This enabled the quick and cheap proliferation of books across Europe, since more 
pages could be printed in less time.33 While it normally used to take three years to produce 
a copy of the Bible, the printing press produced 180 copies in the same period,34 with fewer 
mistakes and an easier sharing of publications among scientists with geographical and time 
constraints.35 
 
This invention caused a detriment in the price of books and a corresponding increase in 
literacy in the fifteenth century in Europe.36 As a result, interest in protecting publishers and 
booksellers from piracy increased.37 
 
2.1.3 Feudal regime of printing privileges in Venice 
 
The first privileges concerning copyright and patents in Venice were not conceived as 
inherent rights of the authors. On the contrary, these privileges were considered a municipal 
favor (gratiae) and an exception to the law (priva lex).38 As explained by Deazley, 
Kretschmer, and Bently, two key 15th century incidents set a precedent for granting 
authorial privileges. In 1484, special privileges were granted to Marc’Antonio Sabellico for 
the publication of Decades rerum Venetarum39 (1486). A decade later, similar legislation 
was implemented in favor of Pietro Tomai of Ravenna for his work Phoenix. Since then, 
writers began to request such privileges from the Venetian State on a regular basis.40  
 
In 1545, the Venetian Council of Ten adopted a statute regulating author-printer relations, 
and commissioners of the University of Padua made censorial revisions of texts.41 This 
prohibited publication of an author’s work without his permission. It is traditionally seen as 
a turning point in the history of authorship, and considered to be "the first public law in 
 
 
31 Andrew Ó Baoill, The True Significance of the World’s First Copyright Ruling in Its Context and for Contemporary Debate on 
Intellectual Property, <https://funferal.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2005/03/firstcopyrightcase.pdf> accessed 25 December 2018. 
32 Richelle McDaniel, McDaniel R, “History of the Book: Disrupting Society from Tablet to Tablet : The Spread of Knowledge Via 
Print” (Western Oregon University, 2015) 29 <https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/history_of_book/1/> accessed 25 December 2018. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 30 citing George Parker Winship, Printing in the Fifteenth Century (1940) <https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/history_of_book/1/> 
accessed 25 December 2018. 
35 Ibid 34 citing Jones International and Jones Digital Century, "Printing: History and Development" Web (1999) 
<https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/history_of_book/1/> accessed 25 December 2018. 
36 Ibid 30 citing Jared Rubin, "Printing and protestants: an empirical test of the role of printing in the Reformation," MPRA Paper (2012) 
<https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/history_of_book/1/> accessed 25 December 2018. 
37 For example: the petition of Bernardino Rasma (1496), Gabriel of Brasichella (1497). 
38 Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer, and Lionel Bently, (ed) Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright (Cambridge 
OpenBook 2010) 22. 
39 History of Venice. 
40 Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer and Lionel Bently, (ed) Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright (Cambridge 
OpenBook 2010) 22. 
41 Joanna Kostylo, “Commentary on the Venetian decree of 1545 regarding author/printer relations” (Primary Sources on Copyright 
(1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, 2008) <www.copyrighthistory.org > accessed 14 November 2018. 





Europe designed specifically to protect authors."42 However, four years later, in 1549, the 
Council of Ten reaffirmed this position in the decree establishing the Guild of Printers and 
Bookselling, stating that “There is no one who represents the aforesaid art, nor who is 
responsible for it, so it happens that everyone does as he pleases amidst extreme disorder 
and confusion,”43 which revealed that the lack of complete regulation caused confusion. 
 
Following 1549, the Venetian guild’s policy of excluding non-members posed a problem 
for individual authors outside the guild to claim privileges and exercise artistic and 
economic control over their own writings. During this struggle, authors started considering 
the nature of rights they enjoyed and expressing ideas about their relationships with their 
publications in a general sense. In the beginning, this understanding was far from our 
modern ideas of “intellectual property” which also extends beyond publication.44 
 
2.1.4 The Worshipful Company of Stationers  
 
In 1533 England, Henry VIII banned the importation of foreign publications and ordered 
that all new books printed in the country had to be approved by the Privy Council before 
publication. From there began a monopolistic tradition in which publishers had to be loyal 
to the crown and pay taxes for their business to strive. 
 
On 4 May 1557 the Worshipful Company of Stationers (WCS) was incorporated by a royal 
decree of Mary I of England and her husband Phillip II of Spain. This charter was 
confirmed by Elizabeth in 1559.45 This mid-16th century decree meant that stationers 
enjoyed political and economic advantages in London, which came with a corporate legal 
status.46 According to Deazley, Kretschmer, and Bently, because of the WCS, the 
Ordinance of 164347 was “focus not on the author - authors were mentioned only once, 
along with printers, as possible producers of scandalous books - but on the WCS as the 
guardian of ‘ancient custom.’48 The goal of the ordinance was to empower the company to 
suppress ‘abuses’ and ‘disorders’ dangerous to religion and government.”49 
 
The 1643 charter expressly decrees that only members of the WCS and Crown patentees 
are allowed to practice in the art of printing, and it prescribes severe penalties for 
infringers. It grants the master and wardens of the Company sweeping powers to search any 
premises belonging to or used by printers or booksellers; to seize burn or hold any printed 
matter “[sic] contrary to the form of any Act Ordnance or proclamation made or to be 
made”; and to imprison any printer, binder, or bookseller acting outside the limits of this or 
 
 
42 Ibid citing “According to Rose, the first English affirmation of authorial interests seems to be a parliamentary edict of 29 January 
1642” Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright, (Harvard University Press 1993). 
43 Preamble of the 1549 Decree chartering the Guild. 
44 Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer and Lionel Bently, Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright (Cambridge 
OpenBook 2010) 30. 
45 AJ Robinson, “The Evolution of Copyright, 1476-1776.” (1991) 22 Cambrian L Rev 55, 59. 
46 William Carew Hazlitt, The Livery Companies of the City of London: their origin, character, development and social and political 
importance (London: Sonnenschein & Co, 1892); Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Stationers' Royal Charter 1557, in Primary 
Sources on Copyright 1450-1900 (eds L Bently & M Kretschmer, 2008) <www.copyrighthistory.org> accessed 19 October 2018. 
47 Charles H Firth and Robert S Rait, “Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660”, vol 1 (HM Stationery Office 1911). 
48 Ibid. 
49 Mark Rose, “The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the Stationers' Company, and the Statute of Anne.” 
(2009) 12(1) Tul J Tech & IntellProp 123, 133. 





any further act or proclamation. In this way, the charter effectively either confirmed or 
extended the powers of the stationers’ company.50 
 
The Company was empowered to create bylaws for the regulation of its own members. It 
was through these laws that the Stationers' copyright developed. It was customary (and then 
obligatory after the company was incorporated) for a bookseller to enter the title of a book 
he was to publish into the register of the Company, the book having been previously 
licensed by the wardens. Following the payment of a registration fee, these entries 
represented a permission to publish and served to establish an exclusive right over the work 
in question. The requirement of the for granting copyright was to have the license from the 
Wardens of the Stationers' Company, and the payment of the registration fee was a 
confirmation of the license.51 
 
2.1.5 Seventeenth and 18th century 
 
In England, the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies by Parliament in 1624 abolished 
most monopolies, and several laws were enacted to reduce the powers of papermakers. In 
the last decades of the 17th century the demand for explicit recognition of sources 
intensified. The worry about the integrity and legitimacy of the original materials reveals a 
new perception of the connections and affinities between earlier and more recent 
texts.52According to Frosio, “a new creative paradigm based on autogenous originality and 
invention emerged from the ashes of imitative practices and erudite borrowing.”53 
 
The protection of copyright was created to safeguard publishers and booksellers, but this 
idea generated a market monopoly for selling literary works. The need to protect publishers 
and booksellers can be explained by the fact that, during the Renaissance and until the first 
half of the 18th centuries, the writer was only thought of as an instrument, a craftsman that 
preserved traditions and poems by writing them down or a person inspired by an external 
source, a muse or God. The writer was always working due to an independent force.54 
 
Changes in the production, distribution and consumption of art in the 18th century55 
generated other views about the right of the authors. Blaise Cronin affirmed that in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, a new conception about scientific texts emerged, accepting merits of the 
author that wrote with a coherent system with methods of verification.56 However, the 
opposite was happening in literature: the role of the literary author and the effort dedicated 
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2.1.6 First Statute 
 
In 1710, the Statute of Anne (“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the 
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times 
therein mentioned”)57 came into effect. According to Bridy, it suggests that “the literary 
notion of the author as originator merged with Locke’s economic theory of possessive 
individualism to produce the legal construct of the author as proprietor.”58 The Statute of 
Anne signified a change from earlier English laws that had granted monopoly to Stationers' 
Company by granting its members the privilege of printing and distributing books. Boyle 
and Jenkins affirm that if a book remained printed, privileges were perpetual. This system 
allowed a monopoly and governmental censorship, since the guild received rights in 
exchange for refusing to print seditious or heretical documents.59 Prior to the Statute of 
Anne, authors were required to deliver their manuscript and any rights they may have had 
to their bookseller.60 The Statute endeavored to change this and ensure that authors benefit 
from these rights.61 
 
This law is the first modern law of protection to the author's rights and “marked the divorce 
of copyright from censorship and the reestablishment of copyright under the rubric of 
property rather than regulation.”62 It vested authors with a real property right, contrary to 
the conception of the literary author of the 18th century, and this recognition fostered their 
creation.63 This can be seen in Section 11 of the Statute of Anne, which provides that, after 
14 years of protection, should the author remain alive, the right would be extended for 
another 14 years.64 
 
2.1.7 Author rights (Germany, 18th century) 
 
The beginnings of the copyright protection as known today can be found in the Germany of 
the 18th century. The debate on the concept of the author and the protection of his rights 
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(1993). 
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continued for years in Germany, while the country was in a period of transition between the 
limited aristocratic sponsorship and the democratic sponsorship of the marketplace.65 
  
Encouraged by a significant reading public, writers who were living poorly and had a new 
romantic vision of authorship, demanded better payment for their work and as said by 
Boyle and Jenkins, “one obvious strategy was to lobby for some kind of legal right to their 
text - the right that we would call copyright.”66  
 
The authors also affirmed that: 
“It is the originality of the author, the novelty which he or she adds to the raw materials 
provided by culture and the common pool, which ‘justifies’ the property right and at the 
same time offers a strategy for resolving the basic conceptual problem pointed out by 
Krause - what concept of property would allow the author to retain some property rights in 
the work but not others? In the German debates, the best answer was provided by the great 
idealist Fichte. In a manner that is now familiar to lawyers trained in legal realism and 
Hohfeldian analysis, but that must have seemed remarkable at the time, Fichte 
disaggregated the concept of property in books. The buyer gets the physical thing and the 
ideas contained in it. Precisely because the originality of his spirit was converted into an 
originality of form, the author retains the right to the form in which those ideas were 
expressed: ‘Each writer must give his own thoughts a certain form, and he can give them 
no other form than his own because he has no other. But neither can he be willing to hand 
over this form in making his thoughts public, for no one can appropriate his thoughts 
without thereby altering their form. This latter thus remains forever his exclusive 
property.’”67 
 
According to Marta Woodmansee, in absolutist Germany, generally petty princes and 
provincial aristocracy took little interest in the arts, and practically nothing in local 
literature. However, German absolutism, thanks to the work of civic-minded philosophers 
and poets, delayed the formation of a middle class and created the very preconditions for an 
energetic artistic and literary world.68 
 
2.1.8 Author Rights (France, 16th to 18th century) 
 
The art 8 of the Edit de Châteaubriant in 1551 was the first French legislation to use the 
concept of  “author” as a legal term referring to the compositor of a text, by asking the 
printers to include the name of the author in the works they published.69 This legislation 
was enacted because the French monarchy wanted to protect itself against the Protestant 
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Reformation, and this was the easiest way to identify who had written a text and to be able 
to retaliate against them. 
 
In France the natural rights justifications for authors were more explicit. They were 
recognized by two decrees of the French Revolution from 1791 and 1793. These decrees 
stated the authors’ and artists’ right to perform and reproduce their works. These thoughts 
spilled over to the neighboring countries in the beginning of the 19th century.70  
 
In France, property and publication were incompatible. The work was considered to be in 
the public domain after publication and only a privilege called "right of sponsorship" 
granted by the State on behalf of the public can guarantee remuneration in exchange for 
such publication.71  
 
According to Deazley, Kretschmer, and Bently, “during the second half of the seventeenth 
century, with the support of monarchy, the Parisian booksellers came to monopolize the 
French book trade and, in attempting to bolster their dominance of the market, they began 
to articulate the notion of the author as the natural owner of his intellectual work."72  
 
And in addition, the decree of 1778 allowed authors to provide the bookseller with right of 
printing and sale of his work and retain for himself the property right,73 which are 
equivalent to the moral rights of the right of author. The concept of the author’s right 
influenced the development of copyright laws in other civil law jurisdictions74 and 
international law. 
 
2.1.9 Multilateral initiatives (19th century) 
 
After problems of free trade of goods in Europe because each country had different 
conceptions about copyright, bilateral treaties provided safeguards between markets of 
different countries for authors and publishers. However, the coverage of the treaties was 
incomplete regarding to the conditions of availability of protection, its level and term.75 
Hence, according to Gervais, by the second part of the 19th century, the time was ripe for 
international arrangement. The Vienna International Exhibition in 1873 regarding industrial 
property,76 and the congress dealing with patents, trademarks and designs during the Paris 
Universal Exhibition of 1878,77  led to the drafting and adoption of the Paris Convention 
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for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1983 (generally just referred to as the Paris 
Convention).78 
 
2.2 General Requirements for Allocating Copyright Ownership 
 
Copyright protection is autonomous in each country, and regulations only apply within the 
country where they are passed, in compliance with the principle of territoriality. However, 
copyright is internationally granted due to the high degree of harmonization through 
international treaties. A number of aspects are similar across jurisdictions, since they follow 
the same guidelines contained in the Berne Convention of 1886,79 which provides 
minimum standards of protection related to works; the Universal Copyright Convention of 
1952; WIPO (the countries addressed in this thesis are members of this organization); and 
the 1996 WCT, ratified by the countries under study,80 which assures the compliance with 
the substantive provisions of the 1971 Act of the Berne Convention. Although several 
concepts about copyright were defined in the Berne Convention, a threshold was not 
established. The legal development of the requirements, intellectual creation, and creation 
fixed in a form of expression have been left to discretion of the national legislators. 
 
In the US, originality is the principal requirement to grant copyright protection. The 1976 
Copyright Act asserts that copyright covers “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”81 The topic has been deeply elaborated in legal cases such as Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony, Baltimore Orioles v MLB Players Association, Bleistein 
v Donaldson Lithographing Co., Slater v Naruto Monkey, and Feist v Rural Telephone, 
which have defined the test of originality that allows copyrightability.  
 
On the other hand, Germany, Colombia, and the UK follow the regulations defined in the 
Berne Convention about protected works.82 In the UK, the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act (CDPA) states that “Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with 
this Part in the following descriptions of work—(a)original literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic works, (b)sound recordings, films (or broadcasts), and(c)the typographical 
arrangement of published editions.” The German copyright act, the Urheberrechtsgesetz 
(UrhG), is more specific and mentions the types of works that deserve copyright 
protection.83 This can also be seen in Colombia in Law No. 23 of 1982.84 In the European 
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Union85 and in the Andean Community of Nations (CAN),86 the guidelines of the Berne 
Convention and WIPO are followed.  
It should be noted, for a deeper understanding of the similarities, that Colombia belongs to 
the CAN,87 composed also of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. The Community maintains a 
cooperative relationship with the European Union. 
  
The following section presents an analysis of each aspect required for a work to be eligible 
for copyright protection. Although all aspects are necessary, each jurisdiction retains 
autonomy in its regulation. For this reason, they differ in how they treat these issues, 
especially those connected to authorship and creativity. This is further explained in the 



























7.  Illustrations of a scientific or technical nature, such as drawings, plans, maps, sketches, tables and three-dimensional representations. 
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The requirements of qualification for copyright protection vary depending on the type of 
work. However, there are general conditions and general exclusions. On the one hand, 
elements that are generally excluded include ideas, procedures, methods of operation, and 
mathematical concepts.88 On the other hand, the works that represent a personal and 
independent intellectual creation (by a human author), a certain degree of originality 
(creative elements), and a fixation of the creation in a form of expression are considered 
eligible.  
 
3.1  Personal and Independent Intellectual Creation by a Human Author 
 
In one possible etymological origin, “author” could derive from the ancient Greek word 
αὐτο´ς, meaning “self.” Based on this reasoning, authorship appears to represent the means 
to express the human self.89 Thus, to be eligible for copyright and for intellectual property, 
being human is in general a requisite. In this conception, creative and individual works 
have been a parameter in the case of civil law countries, like Colombia and Germany, 
where the law supposes, that the author of a work is the copyright owner.90 Likewise, in the 
US, case law permits only humans to be considered as authors.91 On the contrary, UK 
legislation92 contemplates computer-generated works.93 The consideration of computer-
generated works is discussed in depth throughout the thesis.  
 
Although European law seems to harmonize the regulation of authorship, it ultimately 
leaves substantial freedom to member states with regard to implementation. Article 2 (1) of 
the Computer Programs Directive and Article 4 (1) of the Database Directive define the 
author of a computer program or database as either the natural person or group of natural 
persons who have created the program/database or the legal person designated as the right 
holder by the specific legislation of each state. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has ruled that copyright only applies to original works.  In the Infopaq International 
A/S v Danske Dagbaldes Forening case,94 the Court stated that originality must reflect the 
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“author’s own intellectual creation.”95 Apart from these provisions, EU law does not 
comment on copyright authorship.96 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that copyright only applies to original 
works.  In the Infopaq case (C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S/Danske Dagbaldes 
Forening), the Court stated that originality must reflect the expression of the author. 
 
An exception to the requisite of human characteristic of the author and to the general 
concept of copyright is present in the UK and the US: works made for hire.97 In the UK, the 
employer has the first claim to the copyright of the work produced in such circumstances 
(subject to any agreement to the contrary).98 In the US, the law does not presume the 
existence of the figure. On the contrary, the parties should sign a written agreement of work 
made for hire.99 In this way, the law protects companies and business with a different 
perspective on creation that unites the effort, creativity, knowledge, and economic 
investment of several people. 
 
The figure of works made for hire is inclined towards the protection of the economic rights 
of the companies or contracting parties. It is mainly an economic objective that moves the 
possible allocation of copyright to the machines or to the corresponding parties. However, 
as stated by Glasser, “it is unlikely that a court would find that the work made for hire 
doctrine applies in situations where the programmer is not in the position of an employer 
and the user is not considered an employee.”100 Thus, this does not apply to the specific 
topic (AI) of this paper. 
 
3.2 Creative Elements 
 
The second requirement for allocating copyright is that the work be the intellectual creation 
of the author. This means that it must represent some degree of creativity, or to put it in 
academic terms, originality. The threshold of originality is the major concept used to assess 
whether a particular work can be copyrighted or not, and it is also the major obstacle to the 
user’s claim to copyright protection. However, the threshold for originality is low.101 It 
contains, for example, the notions of “purpose,” “contribution,” “novelty,” “aesthetic 
merit,” “labor and effort,”102 and “personality.”103 The regulations104 establish, that 
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copyright protects expressions and not ideas and leaves it to the national legislator to 
evaluate the originality and creativity of individual works. However, they do not mention 
originality. 105 Creativity is one of the recurrent elements that appears in the different 
jurisdictions’ thresholds of copyright protection. Referred to as intellectual creation or 
personality,106 the concept of creativity involves attributes such as learning, valuing, 
feeling, innovating, and expressing, all of which are (historically considered)107exclusive to 
humans.108 
 
There are three considered positions about the threshold of originality for authors: 
 
1) Originality represents the absence of plagiarism. This is the perception of Howard B. 
Abrams,109 based on the US position and the analysis of a number of court cases, especially 
Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing.110  
2) Originality is characterized by the elements of effort and labor. This is the conception of 
Rudolf Monta.111 
3) Originality only has to reflect a certain degree of creativity, as can be deduced from 
copyright legislation. 
 
There is a clear difference between the threshold of originality in the US and the UK, and 
Colombia and Germany. In common law jurisdictions, originality is accepted as the unique 
requirement for passing the threshold of copyrightability (apart from the concept of author), 
since common law gives more value to the economic aspects of copyright.112 Originality in 
common law jurisdictions means that the work is not a copy of an earlier work. On the 
other hand, civil law delves into the personal aspects of authors or the process of creation. 
Consequently, civil law requires not only that the work not be a copy, but also that 
elements of the author's personality be included, that is, that the author express himself 
individually through his work. Thus, Howard B. Abrams' position can be said to be 
applicable in common law jurisdictions and positions two (Rudolf Monta) and three would 
easily apply to civil law jurisdictions. 
 
In EU law, the definition of originality is left to the Courts criteria.113 Authorship is 
attributed based, inter alia, the author’s personal imprint on his work, but the measurement 
of creativity in a work is subjective and is left to the national copyright systems. For 
example, the UK require originality and an unspecified degree of creativity.114 In general, 
 
 
104 Berne and WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
105 Petar Hristov Manolakev, “Works Generated by AI – How Artificial Intelligence Challenges Our Perceptions of Authorship” (Master 
Thesis, Tilburg University, 2017). 
106 In different laws and conventions. 
107 Added by the writer. 
108 Alfredo Vega Jaramillo, “Manual De Derecho De Autor” (2010) Dirección Nacional De Derecho De Autor. 
109 Howard B. Abrams, “Originality and creativity in copyright law” (1992) 55 (2) Law and Contemporary Problems 3  
<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4136&context=lcp> accessed 24 September 2018. 
110 Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
111 Petar Hristov Manolakev, “Works Generated by AI – How Artificial Intelligence Challenges Our Perceptions of Authorship” (Master 
Thesis, Tilburg University, 2017) 16 citing Rudolf Monta, “The Concept of ‘Copyright’ Versus The ‘Droit D’Auteur’ Doctrine” (1959) 
32 (177) Southern California Law Review.  
112 Mabel Goldstein, Derecho de autor, Ediciones la Rocca, Buenos Aires, 1995, 33. 
113 Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Individualität or Originality- Core concepts in German Copyright Law. Universität zu Köln, 2. 
114 Petar Hristov Manolakev, “Works Generated by AI – How Artificial Intelligence Challenges Our Perceptions of Authorship” (Master 
Thesis, Tilburg University, 2017). 





the originality requirement appears in EU legislation in three directives: EU Software 
Directive,115 which provides that a computer program shall receive copyright protection if 
“it is original in the sense that it is the author´s own intellectual creation,” EU Term 
Directive116 that provides a similar provision with regard to the copyrightability of 
photographs and EU Database Directive,117 that extends copyright protection to databases 
that “by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author´s 
own intellectual creation.”118 These directives state that, to merit copyright protection, 
“work must be original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation.”119 
Since no EU directive has established a general standard for originality applicable to all 
copyrightable works, in recent years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has begun to 
harmonize the originality requirement through judicial interpretation.120 The first such case 
was Infopaq International A/S vs Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08), in which the ECJ 
held that it was for the national courts to decide when a reproduction constitutes an 
expression of intellectual creation. This case interprets Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
notably the rights of reproduction, distribution, and communication to the public. It 
constitutes a ratification of the WCT. Other cases handled by the ECJ that attempt to 
harmonize originality standards include the decision of the cases Bezpečnostní softwarová 
asociace - Svaz softwarové ochrany (C-393/09), joint cases Football Association Premier 
League Ltd and other v QC Leisure and other (C-403/08), the case Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) and the case Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags 
GmbH and Others (C-145/10 ). In the case Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz 
softwarové ochrany (C-393/09), after the Ministry of Culture denied the Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace authorization to exercise collective management of copyright rights 
linked to computer programs. The Tribunal of Justice concluded that “any form of 
expression of a computer program must be protected from the moment when its 
reproduction would engender the reproduction of the computer program itself, thus 
enabling the computer to perform its task.”121 In the same way in the joint cases Football 
Association Premier League Ltd and other v QC Leisure and other (C-403/08) state that the 
sequences of digital video and audio recordings are part of the original intellectual creation 
of the author of the broadcast. In the case Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd 
(C-429/08), Karen Murphy, manager of a Portsmouth bar, purchased a NOVA decoder card 
to screen Premier League matches without any fee payment. Agents from Media Protection 
Services Ltd discovered that Mrs. Murphy was receiving Premier League match broadcasts 
from NOVA at her bar. Accordingly, the Portsmouth Court convicted her of infringing the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act claiming she received a programme of a broadcasting 
service in a dishonest manner with the intention of avoiding the fee applicable to the 
reception of the programme, and in the case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags 
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GmbH and Others deals with the originality standard as applied to a portrait photography of 
an Austrian child who was later kidnapped for eight years and made worldwide news after 
her escape in 2006. The decision in this case notes that an intellectual creation should 
reflect the author´s personality, and his capability to express his creative ability requires 
him to make free choices.122 
German courts used to require a substantial degree of originality, especially for works of 
applied art: only objects whose artistic quality was substantially higher than what the 
ordinary designer was able to produce were considered copyrightable. In the decision of the 
Geburtstagszug (The Birthday Train) case, the German Bundesgerichtshof left this standard 
because its purpose was to distinguish copyright from design protection, while the new 
European Directive separates design rights.123 
In Colombia and in the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the authorship concept is, 
as well as in the EU, based on the author’s personal imprint on the work. And the 
originality or individuality is concretized in the work by expressing what is proper to its 
author, which bears the imprint of his personality,124 involving a creative contribution to 
inventive works.125 
 
During Trade-Mark Cases,126 the US Supreme Court stated that “the writings which are to 
be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor… founded in the creative powers of the 
mind.”127 Congress clarified the standard of originality in the Bleistein v Donaldson 
Lithographing case of 1903,  stating: “The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is 
purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of 
originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does 
not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to 
enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.”128 However, in the 1991 Feist 
Publication Inc. v  Rural Telephone Service Company Inc. case of 1991, the US Supreme 
Court changed its decision and ruled that compilations with a degree of creativity should be 
considered original works and hence be copyright protected. Goldstein v California129 
provides that the original authorship of a work requires an element of interpretation or 
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3.3 Creation Fixed in a Form of Expression 
 
The foundation of copyright, in addition to creativity, is the artistic stimulus.130 Therefore, 
in principle, copyright is automatically obtained once a work has been created and 
embodied in a tangible form of expression. However, the Berne Convention leaves the 
power to prescribe that works in general or any specific category of works shall only be 
protected if they have been fixed in some material form.131 The explanation is that 
copyright does not protect ideas, but the expressions of these ideas.132 As stated by Brown, 
“the key is that the expression is preserved in some persistent communicative medium, 
some useable vehicle for later communication.”133  
 
The EU has not harmonized the requirements for a work to be considered as “fixed”: as 
with the other factors discussed in this section, this is left to the member states to decide. In 
the UK, “copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or musical work unless and until 
it is recorded, in writing or otherwise,”134 And some types of works (sound recordings, 
films, broadcasts, typographical arrangements) can generally only exist in a material form, 
although they  are not bound by the requisite fixation.135 In The US, fixation is also a 
requirement for obtaining copyright: “a work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or 
phonorecord for the first time.”136 
 
By contrast, German and Colombian copyright law does not impose a fixation requirement 
as a prerequisite of copyright protection.137 In countries with a civil law system, the 
prevailing position is that the granting of copyright does not depend on fixation.138 Instead, 
works are protected with copyright when the works is perceptible139 in a form of 
expression, regardless of whether they have a material support or not. However, in 
Germany, the five-step-test to allocate copyright failed in the case of Eva & Adele because 
the Hamburg District Court (Landgericht) ruled that artist and work are identical and 
therefore there is no fixation which can be separated from the person of the author 
“Wherever we are is Museum.”140 As stated by Elizabeth Adeney, “For example, protection 
in Germany is afforded to authored ‘language works,’ including unfixed speeches, and to 
unfixed musical works expressed solely in the form of sound.”141 In the same way, Law No. 
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The genesis of artificial intelligence took place in 1943, with the proposal of Warren 
McCulloch and Walter Pitts of a model of artificial neurons in which each neuron is “on” or 
“off,” the former occurring in response to stimulation by neighboring neurons.142 This later 
inspired the works of John McCarthy, who coined the term artificial intelligence in 1955.143 
He presented this concept at the Dartmouth Conference144 in 1956 and developed AI during 
a two-month workshop at Dartmouth College, marking the beginning of AI as an area of 
knowledge. His work was continued by other researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.145 McCarthy defines AI as “the science and engineering of making intelligent 
machines, especially intelligent computer programs. It is related to the similar task of using 
computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not have to confine itself to 
methods that are biologically observable.”146 Artificial intelligence shares many concepts 
with philosophy,147 and it is, in fact, based on some philosophical and scientific 
presuppositions.148 
 
Russell and Norvig149 analyze eight theories of different scholars and organized them into 
four categories of definitions of AI.150 These categories are presented in Figure 1, Russell 
and Norvig’s Four Categories of AI Definitions. 
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Figure 1: Russell and Norvig’s Four Categories of AI Definitions. 
 
Figure 1 highlights the division of ideas of different AI scholars. On the one hand, there are 
those who understand AI as systems that imitate the actions of humans, while on the other 
hand, there are a number of academics who believe that these systems are rational in 
themselves. Russell and Norvig provide a more global approach through the concept of 
machine learning, which “refers to a subfield of computer science concerned with computer 
programs that are able to learn from experience and thus improve their performance over 
time.”151 Thus, AI becomes better and more efficient via reinforcement learning, which 
happens without further programming.152 
 
4.2 Classification of AI 
 
Classifying AI is not an easy task, because it is a concept with no clear definition and 
multiple possible functions.153 The WIPO program notes provide descriptions of three 
categories of AI: perception systems, natural-language systems, and expert systems.154  
 
Perception systems (i.e. “computer vision”) are systems that permit a computer to 
“perceive” the world, typically by providing it with a “sense” of “sight” or “hearing.”155 
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Natural- language systems are computers programmed to understand natural human 
languages. The program applies the AI technology of semantic analysis and must 
understand the rules of syntax. A technique called pragmatic analysis utilizes knowledge 
about the real world to assist these programs in making choices about the meaning of words 
and sentences.156 
 
Expert systems consist of an ordinary form of a database that allows for storing specific 
knowledge and following a series of instructions to solve a problem according to the logical 
rules that this data implies. The databases are managed through a program that allows the 
combination and recombination of pre-established situations.157 
 
There are also other types of AI that are not mentioned in the WIPO program notes, such as 
the neural networks or connectionist systems. A neural network is a system in which 
machine learning algorithms work together and process complex data entries.158 The 
software learns to perform tasks by considering examples, without being programmed with 
specific rules.159 
 
Machine learning is a subset of AI that can produce systems capable of learning 
independently without further human programming.160 It can be accomplished in a 
supervised or an unsupervised way.161  When it is unsupervised, the system acts and 
observes the consequences of its actions without referring to any predefined type cases 
other than those previously observed.162 These systems are capable of learning and self-
supplying data. This occurs with through the combination of neural networks, the 
parameters given by the programmer, and trial-and-error, self-supplied data. As stated by 
Guadamuz, a remarkable characteristic of this type of artificial intelligence is that the work 
is generated by the computer program163 in a process similar to the thought processes of 
human beings, although programmers can also establish parameters.164  
 
This thesis uses the two major branches of AI described by Hristov in “Artificial 
Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma.” Artificial intelligence is thus divided into 
programs which work with intervention of human beings (supervised) and those that act 
autonomously, without human intervention (unsupervised). The latter category is the one 
addressed in the current thesis. However, in addition to the supervised and unsupervised 
categories of machine learning, there are semi-supervised and reinforcement categories. 
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4.3 The Creativity of AI 
 
As researches discovered new possible applications of AI to real world problems, the 
demand for a workable knowledge representation scheme increased and many 
representations and reasoning languages were therefore developed.165 
 
Since the digital revolution of the 1970s, computers have produced works of art. Although 
most of these works were initially actually produced by humans, specifically by 
programmers, with the machine learning system, the computer program actually makes 
decisions in the creative process without human intervention,166 uses verbal or visual 
vocabulary and composes distinct works by independently applying a system of rules.167 
Thus, algorithmic logic can be considered as a form of creativity. 
 
The different branches of AI and their similarity with the characteristics of human 
intelligence have made it common for many to compare computer processors with the 
human brain, establishing a close simile in their functioning. There is a debate among AI 
scholars about the presence or lack of creativity in computers, and whether this creativity 
functions the same way as it does in humans.168 However, just as the concept of intelligence 
is not limited to biologically observable criteria, so the concept of creativity need not be 
limited in this way. Artificial intelligence has been significantly developed in recent years, 
and by using its machine learning system, it has almost eliminated human participation in 
the creation of copyrightable works. However, AI lacks the capacity to break the rules that 
is has been provided by the programmers: this is Ada Lovelace’s key argument in favor of 
AI being unable to create.169 Yet people, especially children, also often create different 
kinds of works without departing from set instructions, and these works are still considered 
to have been realized with intellectual effort. Thus, the programmers set parameters, but the 
work is autonomously generated by the program.170  
 
According to Bridy, “Avant-gardists171 like Calvino raise the possibility that humans and 
machines, if we consider the rulebound nature of their respective outputs and the pre-
existing models they are wont to emulate, are really not as different as we are conditioned 
to believe.172 Calvino’s figure of the author as a writing machine is about as radical a 
deconstruction of the figure of the romantic author173 as a good post-modernist could wish 
for, and it is arguably one whose time has come in the discourse on copyright law.”174 
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Today, AI is used in a number of different fields, such as robotic vehicles, speech 
recognition, autonomous planning and scheduling, game playing, spam fighting, logistics 
planning, robotics, and machine translation.175 In the context of this thesis, the most 
important functions of AI are those that result in intellectual creation. One example of this 
is “The Next Rembrandt” project,176 a facial-recognition algorithm that learned 
Rembrandt’s techniques by studying 346 paintings and created a portrait using these 
techniques.177 This project proves that machines can paint, by creating a piece of art that 
resembles Rembrandt’s style, and it exposes the difficulty of identifying the creator of the 
production.178 
 
In 1983, the book The Policeman's Beard Is Half Constructed, was composed by RACTER, 
a computer program that writes semi-coherent stories using the vocabulary stored in its 
memory and applying grammatical rules.179 Another program of this type is the WaveNet 
project, a deep generative model of audio data which generates multi-speaker speech (not 
conditioned on text), Text-to-speech and music audio modelling.180 It is not possible to 
comprehend how the output sounds made by this program, which works with a deep neural 
network, were made. The programmers or users can only control the input and see the 
output, but there is no way to understand what happens in-between.181 
 
Due to its ability to play an intuition game, the development of Google DeepMind, 
AlphaGo, is perhaps the most interesting AI achievement to date. AlphaGo was the first 
software that defeated a world champion in the game of Go,182 Lee Sedol, by 100 games to 
0. The most recent version of this program is AlphaGo Zero. Unlike previous versions, 
AlphaGo Zero does not train with human players: it is its own teacher and learns by playing 
games against itself.183 
 
According to Hristov, “as computers become faster and more capable, creativity machines 
and other forms of AI will likely take center stage in the creative process, becoming the 
main drivers of creativity and innovation.”184 Machines use a neural architecture that 
involves making connections subject to disturbances (random or systematic), to produce 
patterns that represent ideas or plans of action. These notions are communicated to the 
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algorithm and the algorithm evaluates novelty, utility, value, or attractiveness to finally 
create the creative product.185 
 
4.4   Business of AI generated works 
 
The main question to answer about business of AI-generated works is to what extent can 
copyright law be explained as a means for allocating efficient allocation of resources.186 
Further research on the economic impact is necessary after answering the question of whom 
to allocate copyright for works made by AI.  
 
As stated by the WIPO in The Guide on Surveying the Economic Contribution of the 
Copyright Industries “Copyright law is designed to establish the right balance between 
different economic effects, investing the necessary time in cultural creations, their proper 
distribution, and the protection and enforcement of the rights involved. This balance is 
manifested through the law’s main functions and consequences.”187 In this way, in the 
future, copyright law must adapt its design to fit the faster changing circumstances and 
development of “thinking” computer programs, so the resources can be allocated 
efficiently. However, at the moment it is hard to estimate and predict the speed in which 
AI-generated works will have impact. 
 
Robert Hurt and Robert Schuchman group the various justifications offered in favor of 
copyrights under two headings: “those which are based on the rights of the creator of the 
protected object or on the obligation of society to reward him, and those which are based on 
the promotion of the general well-being of society.”188 The AI does not benefit from rights 
of a creator, and the AI itself can already be copyrighted by its programmer. Thus, the 
argument about promotion of well-being of the society must become more prominent in 
future legal discussion and law-making, especially in the case of granting copyright to AI. 
AI-generated works have, in most countries, no copyright, because it is not created by a 
human author. It has a negative effect for the companies creating these AI, because they 
need to invest a lot for creating the machines. Therefore, no copyright protection may have 
a devastating impact on automated systems development. Programmers would feel 
discouraged from creating if they doubt that copyright would be guaranteed to them and 
that they would therefore not receive financial compensation.189 For promoting the general 
well-being of the society, it must be assured that the programmer reaps the benefit from AI-
generated works to have the motivation to invest time and money in creating these 
programs. In broader terms, copyright law should be created so it improves well-being, 
growth, and development by encouraging creativity and progress. In addition, copyright 
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It is important to judge the copyright protection by the welfare it offers. This subject 
certainly deserves more investigation.191 This opinion is still relevant, especially because of 
the rise of works created by non-human authors. There need to be studies on how to 
maximize the welfare with the adequate copyright regulations. According to Watt Richard,  
 
“In summary, copyright law is designed to allow for the creation of the optimal amount of 
cultural assets and to allow for the efficient distribution via market transactions of the 
underlying intellectual property so that it can be consumed by those who most value it. In 
order for intellectual property to exist and content to be created, creators must be 
sufficiently compensated, or they will find alternative employment. Creation implies an 
initial fixed cost to the creator (opportunity costs, effort, etc.), and production implies a 
variable cost whenever the underlying intellectual property is attached to the chosen 
delivery goods and a unit of the delivery goods is produced and marketed. If intellectual 
property is not protected, it will be easily reproduced. (..) This would undermine profits 
and could lead to insufficient compensation for the creator. Under a system of legal 
protection, the marginal cost of reproduction is increased, and the market price does not 
fall as far as when originals and copies compete. Creators can thus enjoy 
compensation.”192  
 
This opinion of Watt is also applicable for AI-generated works. In this case, the production 
has high cost and the outputs are uncertain. Thus, it is even more important to legally 
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5  THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP 
 
 
5.1 The Programmer or Developer 
 
Attributing rights to the programmer makes sense with the current required element of 
human creativity in the threshold of copyrightability. The programmer has invested time 
and effort in creating the AI responsible for the final work, and he alone understands the 
algorithm and the creative process behind the output.193 Because of the ideas of the 
programmer to create the AI, there are given visible expressions of a work, indirectly 
created by the programmer.194 The programmer also deserves recognition because, as stated 
by Pamela Samuelson, “creating an excellent generator program is intellectually 
demanding, as well as time-consuming and expensive for the programmer.” 195 
 
Andrew Wu posits that the programmer should be the copyright owner if the output of the 
program is repeatable, and if the user input is limited. In this case, the generated work does 
not meet the minimum degree of creativity.196 
 
Statutorily, the central argument that leads the programmer to be recognized as an author is 
his familiarity with and understanding of the creative process. Although the programmer is 
not the direct creator of the work, he is the one who understands how the algorithm works 
and who can explain the creative process. As Sorjamaa explains, because the programmer 
is the creator of the algorithm, he has the right to benefit from it.197 
 
The first country to recognize AI's creative capacity to generate works was the UK, which 
assigns the copyright of computer-generated works to humans in its legislation.198 The 
CDPA states that “In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is 
computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”199 The law allocates ownership to 
the programmer for these type of works, since he is responsible for  the setting under which 
they were created. Like the photographer standing behind a camera, an intelligent 
programmer or team of programmers stands behind every AI.200 In the U.K, the Nova 
Productions Ltd. v Mazooma Games Ltd. case,201 and in the U.S the cases Atari Inc. v 
North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp.202 and Williams Elec. Inc. v Arctic Int’l. 
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Inc.,203 are cases that examined the allocation of authorship for copyrightable works created 
by algorithms in video games. There, the Courts decided based on the programmer´s 
understanding and explanation of the product.204 
 
The consideration of granting copyright to the programmer for works created by the 
artificial intelligence he programmed is feasible in cases where there is a logical connection 
between the programmer and the machine can be understood. This theory is based on well-
founded logic and long-standing legal traditions such as Lockean ethics and the doctrine of 
"forehead sweat" and would be an example of Ada Lovelace's understanding that a machine 
"can (only) do what we know how to command it to do.” 205    
 
Following this line of reasoning, in cases where the computer-generated work clearly 
contains the original work fixed in a tangible medium of expression that should qualify it 
for copyright protection, it seems fair to award the copyright to the programmer.206 
However, granting the programmer authorship over the creations of his creation would give 
him two rewards. One for his original work in creating the AI and another unfair reward for 
the work of the machine.207 Copyright would thus be granted based on questionable origins, 
contradicting the principle of intellectual property that searches for protection of products 
created with human intellectual labor.208 
 
5.2 The Program Owner   
 
According to Wu,209 the owner210 of the AI should own the copyright under the following 
circumstances: 
• The program output is not repetitive or predictable (fixation requirement). 
• There is no significant user contribution. 
• Joint authorship between the programmer and user is not possible. 
• The program output clearly “owes its origin” to the program itself.211 
• Awarding copyright protection to the owner would encourage the fictional human 
author to create future works. 
Companies and other investors in AI provide technological and financial resources for the 
creation of new AI. When they hire programmers or commission works, the works are 
created by employees following set instructions. In this case, copyright can be granted to 
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the employer. However, this possibility is only clearly legislated in countries which 
recognize the notion of works made for hire, the US,212 the UK,213 Australia,214 and 
Japan.215 
 
In the US, when a work is “made for hire,” the authorship is attributed to the employer or 
commissioner and not to the actual creator.216 This authorship carries all of the vested rights 
of copyright: the actual creator of the work is never attributed not retains any residual 
rights. The employer or commissioner is, strictly speaking, the original creator of the 
work.217 
 
In the UK, when the work is made in the course of employment, copyright is granted either 
to the employer or the author depending on the specific circumstances.218 Copyright is fully 
granted to the commissioning party only when there is a preexisting agreement to this 
effect.219 
 
Legislation in the EU, Colombia, and Germany contains a concept that is similar to the 
notion of works made for hire.220 It distinguishes between the attribution of moral and 
economic rights.221 In these cases, the person who created the work is the owner of 
copyright, but the employer is entitled to all the economic rights associated with the work. 
 
Section V, “dealing with Rights in Copyright” of the UrhG states, in the subsection II, 
“Exploitation rights,” article 43, that “The provisions of this subsection shall also apply if 
the author has created the work in execution of his duties under a contract of employment 
or service provided nothing to the contrary transpires from the terms or nature of the 
contract of employment or service.” This means that the author continues to retain, in 
addition to moral rights, economic rights, unless otherwise stipulated. 
 
In Germany, as a general rule, all rights are guaranteed to the author. However, 
exceptionally, Article 89 UrhG creates the presumption that all authors of an audiovisual 
work have granted exclusive exploitation rights to the producer and Article 69b establishes 
a situation in which a similar presumption is made in the interest of the employer or the 
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In Colombia, the employee retains the moral rights, but in principle it is presumed that the 
employer holds the economic rights. Article 20 of the 1982 Law 23 regulates this issue as 
follows:  
"In works created for a natural or legal person in compliance with a contract for the 
provision of services or an employment contract, the author is the original owner of the 
economic and moral rights; but it is presumed, unless otherwise agreed, that the economic 
rights over the work have been transferred to the commissioner or to the employer, as the 
case may be, to the extent necessary for the exercise of their usual activities at the time of 
creation of the work. For this presumption to operate, the contract must be in writing. The 
owner of the works according to this article may attempt directly or through a person 
preservative actions against acts violating moral rights previously informing the author or 
authors to avoid duplicity of actions.” 
 
The problem with this ownership theory is that there is no working relationship between the 
programmer and the owner or between the AI and the owner. If the programmer is 
considered to be an employer, the most logical solution would be to avoid creating a legal 
exception and guarantee copyright to the programmer. However, AI cannot be considered 
to be an employee because it is a machine: it cannot sign contracts and lacks the element of 
will. 
 
5.3 The Program User 
 
The theory of granting copyright to the user responds to the impression that the user 
employs the AI as a tool to create the final work, which is thus a product of the user’s 
creativity. 
  
In consonance with this position, in the US, a 1978 National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) report states that program users 
should hold copyright,223 arguing that the machine lacks creativity. At this time, the 
majority of opinions supported the idea that the user should be the owner of the copyright 
of computer-generated works.224 However, a decade later, the Office of Technological 
Assessment (OTA) issued a report questioning CONTU’s arguments and notably stating 
that it is misleading to think of programs as inert tools of creation.225 
 
In the EU, Article 2(3) of the Software Directive 91/250/EEC enshrines the employer's 
right to exercise economic rights over computer-generated works of an employee, when the 
work is given in the exercise of his functions or following the employer's instructions. If a 
work is created by an employee, the copyright is assigned to the person or entity 
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responsible for bringing a creative work into the world, independently of the direct 
involvement of the person or entity in the creative effort.226  
In the same way, even if the user of an AI program did not contribute to the process of 
creation of the work, the user is the person who most immediately caused the realization of 
the work. Based on this, it can be argued, as explained by Samuelson, that using “a 
generator program in some sense has ‘employed’ the computer and its programs for his 
creative endeavors. By this line of argument, similar considerations to those that underlie 
the employment rule support allocation of rights in AI generated works to users, regardless 
of the extent of their creative input.” However, only Directive 91/250/EEC on computer 
programs includes this rule on "work made for hire," and the question of works protected 
by the copyright of workers in general remains in each member state.227 
 
According to Wu,228 the user can be the owner of the copyright of programs that provide 
tools for the user to express their creativity under the following circumstances: 
 
• The program output is not repetitive or predictable (fixation requirement). 
• The user’s input satisfies both the fixation and the minimal creativity requirement. 
• Joint authorship is not possible because the programmer fails to comply with the 
fixation requirement, 
• The user is the “originator” of the work rather than the program itself. 
 
Nevertheless, most of the domestic copyright laws agree that execution does not 
automatically turn a person into an author.229 Artificial intelligence is not always merely a 
tool. Annemarie Bridy explains that “some computer systems are designed to produce 
works that fall under the rubric of algorithmic or generative art, in which practitioners of 
generative art take a systems- approach to artistic production, removing their own 
personalities from the creative process and ceding control to self-executing algorithms.”230 
The definition of algorithmic creativity and the conception of creativity of AI researchers is 
not bonded to philosophical points of view. Instead, researchers focus on programming 
computers to do creative artifacts that are recognized as songs, paintings or poems.231 In 
other words, as stated by Wu, “as computer programs become more and more sophisticated 
– so that more and more of the creativity in a program´s output derives from the computer 
program rather than the user –it becomes clear that a more sophisticated test is required to 
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5.4 Joint Ownership 
 
5.4.1 Programmer - Program owner 
 
Granting copyright to human authors fulfills the purpose of fomenting the development of 
the AI industry, and promoting the creation of AI-generated works.233 For this reason, 
courts should attribute copyright protection in such a manner that encourage the 
development of protectable works and art.234 Courts can provide the incentive for AI and 
art development by granting copyright ownership to programmers and owners. Thus, 
independent programmers could hold the copyrights of the works generated by their AI, 
while in the case that they are linked to a company to create AI, through a work contract, 
copyrights would belong to both programmers and companies.235 
 
The AI sector benefits when programmers are enthusiastic about continuing to create 
algorithms and programs, and when companies invest. Despite of the benefits this set up, 
financial investment is not a creative contribution to work, and, therefore, there is no joint 
ownership between the programmer and the program owner. 
 
5.4.2 Programmer - User 
 
Wu argues that the program and the user could obtain copyright protection when many 
features of the output are predictable and repeatable, the user’s choices meet the 
requirement of minimal creativity, and the programmer and user intend to be joint authors, 
contributing parts of a unitary whole.236 
 
Joint ownership could, in some ways, solve the problem of allocating copyright of 
computer-generated works to humans. However, this conception is easily supported, 
because collaborative work is not necessarily joint work. In addition, a contributor could 
only claim joint authorship if the contribution represents an “original expression that stands 
on its own.”237 The first obstacle to joint authorship is the requirement that both the user's 
and the programmer's contributions must be copyrightable,238 because the contribution is 
mainly from the machine or its programmer, and the user is only a performer.  For this 
reason, and because of the lack of collaboration between the parties, there is no possible 
claim of joint authorship. 
 
Dr. Thomas Dreier and Dr. Gerhard Schricker explored the possibility of reforming of 
German copyright law to integrate a framework for dealing with multimedia creations and 
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new technologies. They suggest two ways of conceiving the role of the computer, as either 
a tool or an instrument. In the latter case, it is the computer that makes the decisions. In this 
scenario, a co-authorship could be established, in which the programmer who develops the 
existing routines and different options shares credit with those who have interference in the 
management of them.239 In this case, the programmer has the right to control distribution of 
any unauthorized derivative work, while the users have the rights to any original expression 
that they create.240 According to Wu, “although these rights would not be ‘ownership’ 
rights that would allow the user to distribute the work, these rights would allow the user to 
preclude the programmer from distributing the derivative work.”241 
 
Thus, this notion of co-authorship does not resolve the allocation of copyright in non-
derivative AI generated works, because it would affect those who have mainly contributed 
in the creation of the AI and the person who has worked indirectly in the creation of the 
work. 
 
5.4.3 Programmer - AI  
 
This theory would solve the legal limitations of granting copyright to a non-human author 
by assigning the rights to a human co-author. In this way, the AI holds the title of author 
but does not grant it economic rights, although the AI has recognition. However, 
recognition does not mean that the AI and the programmer are truly co-authors. Common 
and civil law jurisdictions demand the contributions made by co-authors to be 
distinguishable. This would be almost impossible in the case of AI programming with 
machine learning, due to its complexity. Such inability to distinguish between the 
contributions of potential co-authors makes joint authorship unfeasible.242 
 
5.5 Special Categories 
 
At the WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Artificial 
Intelligence, two new theories were proposed.243 
 
The first theory suggests that expert systems should be considered as a special and concrete 
class of computer programs, which would demand a special classification of them. The 
second theory considers expert systems as a dual category that represents characteristics of 
both computer programs and databases. This means that they are not protected as a special 
category of creation but instead share the legal statutes of both elements.244 
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The WIPO was in favor of the second thesis put forward and expressed this in a proposed 
addition to the Berne Convention. Ultimately, these points did not finally appear in the 
treaty adopted in December 1996 in the city of Geneva. This issue remains a part of the 
agenda of discussion in committee sessions that meet with a view of adapting the Berne 
Convention protocol.245 
 
With respect to the first theory, the report highlights that “the more autonomous robots are, 
the less they can be considered simple instruments in the hands of external agents.”246 
Because of this, the general rules on liability are not sufficient, and different rules that 
focus on how a machine should behave are required. These new rules need to center on 
whether a machine can be held partially or fully liable for its acts. As a consequence, it has 
become increasingly urgent to address the fundamental question of whether robots should 
have legal personality and regulate computer-generated works. The relevance of this topic 
was clear on October 25, 2017. On this day, the robot Sophia247 became a citizen of Saudi 
Arabia, the first robot to hold legal human citizenship.  
 
5.6 The Algorithm (AI) 
 
International considerations seem to dismiss the notion of a non-human author having the 
ownership of copyright protection of its works,248 based on the arguments of human 
authorship, personality, and intellectual labor: because the lack of direct incidence on the 
resulting work, AI is never considered to be the originator. Nonetheless, these arguments 
can be contradicted by looking closely at the definition of authorship and creativity and 
analyzing the link between the actual creativity of AI and the work it produces. A 
generalized change in the definitions to include not only human aspects could lead to new 
legislation on the subject. After CONTU´s final report, OTA began to define the computer 
as a non-inert tool, “the stage is set for granting copyright to the computer itself.”249  
 
In 2016, the European Parliament requested the establishment criteria relating to “own 
intellectual creation” applicable to computer or robot-generated works. The European 
Commission has started a discussion and initiated the development of policies to grant rights to 
robots.250 While this is an ongoing process with no resolution in sight, it demonstrates the 
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Based on the requirement to express creativity, the own intellectual creation or personality, 
IA authorship would not conform to European, Colombian or American creativity 
standards.252 However, works generated by AI may meet this requirement if the concept of 
algorithmic creativity is accepted. The problem is that although the neural architecture of 
AI involves creativity, under current legal circumstances, this type of creativity is not 
considered sufficient for the attribution of authorship. 
 
As a disadvantage of this theory, it can be considered that the AI is not the direct creator of 
original works. As there are AI that use machine learning to learn for themselves,253 
develop strategies,254 and use algorithmic creativity,255  there are others that only act as an 
instrument. Furthermore, on a more general level of copyright, AI authorship contradicts 
one of the objectives of intellectual property law as it does not provide an incentive for 
authors to create and bring benefits to society.256 
 
 
At an academic level, Wu states that authorship should be granted to the AI in following 
conditions: 
 
• The programmer of the AI fails the fixation requirement because the work produced 
is not repeatable or predictable. 
• There is no “user” of the AI (in other words, AI has produced the art work on its 
own). This means that joint ownership is not applicable. 
• Joint ownership is not applicable because there is no user. 
• The work generated by the AI meet the requirements of fixation and originality as 
they would for a human. 
• The AI possesses the discretion over whether to produce future works, and, 
therefore, awarding it copyright protection encourages the creation of future 
creative works. 
 
Finally, although AI can produce copyrightable original works,257 computers are not able to 
execute several tasks required to be suitable for copyright protection. For example, AI 
cannot sue because of an infringement of its rights, and it cannot transfer rights to third 
parties to meet the needs of a dynamic market. Finally, machines cannot be motivated to do 
tasks or create works by granting them copyright or rights in the outputs:258 unlike the 
human developers, AI have no use for financial incentives. Thus, without the contribution 
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of AI programmers and companies, AI would no longer be available for the general 
public.259 
 
5.7 Public domain 
 
Daniel Gervais proposes that, although original works can be produced autonomously by a 
computer, these works fall into the public domain because international copyright does not 
dispense protection. This is because only human intellectual creations are protectable: since 
no one can claim ownership, anyone can therefore use the works generated by 
computers.260  
 
This argument places AI generated works in the category of free/libre software and open-
source software (FLOSS) with a copyleft license. Thus, the work remains accessible, and 
this model appears to establish a potential for uncoordinated and decentered creativity.261 
To its favor, this position argues that creators or artists have an incentive other than 
economic gain, and the process of creation involves knowledge and contribution from 
different persons. For example, David Berry highlights that no man is an island, and 
creativity is thus always a collective achievement.262 Bridy emphasizes the “close 
relationship between legal and literary constructions of the notion of ‘authorship’” (and 
thus the collective creation of works).263 Following the same line, Mark Rose wrote that 
“Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique individual who creates something 
original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labors. Until recently, the dominant 
modes of aesthetic thinking have shared the romantic and individualistic assumptions 
inscribed in copyright. But these assumptions obscure important truths about the processes 
of cultural production,”264 the creative process of production would be represented by a 
collectivity. Peter Jaszi affirms that “The persistence of the notion of ‘authorship’ in 
American copyright law makes it difficult for any new legal synthesis, which would focus 
on the reality of collective creativity, to emerge.”265 The notion of author as a unique 
person with completely original ideas, creates difficulties at the time of leaving works in 
the public domain, although these have been the fruit of a social construction. Woodmansee 
asserts that “The law has yet to be affected by the ‘critique of authorship’ initiated by 
Foucault (…). It would seem that as creative production becomes more corporate, 
collective, and collaborative, the law invokes the Romantic author all the more 
insistently.”266 However, it cannot be denied, that one or more authors have greater 
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Copyleft licenses grant certain freedom to the users of a software, such as using, reading or 
modifying its source code and distributing the software to third parties. Furthermore, 
FLOSS developers uphold other values related to freedom, such as open communication, 
decision-making, and community orientation.267 
 
Nevertheless, the public domain theory illustrates a basic problem presented by AI: the rule 
of awarding copyright protection to the “originator” of a work conflicts with the objective 
promoting future creativity by awarding copyright.268 The choice of whether copyright 
includes economic compensation should be decided by the author by, for example, 
explicitly indicating that the software is intended to be free or open-source. Changing the 
regulation to automatically assign AI copyright to the public domain could be detrimental 
to the author’s rights: it would be equating AI generated works with works that do not meet 
the criteria for protection. Furthermore, although AI does not fulfill the human author 
requisite, there are always humans, the programmer, owners, and users, indirectly involved 
in the construction of these works. These people invest effort, creativity, and time. They 
should be awarded with copyright protection. In addition, the incentive of the progress of 
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6 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
 
Each country has autonomy to regulate copyright in its jurisdiction within the framework of 
international copyright treaties.270 Even under the Berne Convention,271 the faculty of each 
country to specify their own rules is mentioned,272 in an attempt to protect the rights of 
authors in an effective and uniform manner,273 since copyright protection is subject to the 
principle of territoriality and lex loci protectionis.274 The members of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS agreement) have the 
obligation to directly harmonize the law with the budgets of the agreement. Whether a work 
published in one state enjoys copyright protection in another state is subject to international 
treaties.275 Despite many specific different, the legal systems276 overall agree that the term 
“author” refers to a human being who exercises subjective judgment and who controls its 
execution.277 
Specifically, the problem that corresponds to this thesis is that the fundamental requirement 
that the work has been created by a person does not include works created by AI systems, 
but in the legal development of copyright protection in this type of work, jurisdictions have 
already advanced.  
 




Under UK law, copyright law remains structured around specific categories of works.278 
This has created problems for unconventional creations, which do not easily fall into one of 
these categories.279 However, the CDPA includes a mention and regulation on the subject 
of computer-generated works, by stating, “’computer-generated,’ in relation to a work, 
means that the work is generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human 
author of the work.”280 However, computer generated is different to AI generated. The 
autonomy of the machine in an AI generated work distinguishes them. And the CDPA 
reveals vagueness when it states, regarding computer-generated works, that “the author of 
the work shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the 
creation of the work are undertaken.”281 But in this case, the creator is neither a human nor 
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a juridical person. As machines cannot be legal right holders, the lawmakers felt the need to 




For many years, the standards for originality had been determined by the landmark UK 
case: Walter v Lane.283 The ruling of Walter v Lane determined that a set of hand-written 
notes was constituted “considerable intellectual skill and brain labor.”284 Specifically, this 
case concerned a reporter who transcribed and corrected a speech of Lord Rosebery and 
decided that the former should be awarded copyright ownership of the text.  
Another significant case in the development of UK copyright law is Ladbroke v William 
Hill, which pitted two of the largest British betting companies and bookmakers, Ladbroke 
and William Hill, against each other. Since the 1950s, William Hill's "fixed and odd" 
football coupons included a list of upcoming matches. Over the next decade, Ladbroke 
entered the business and adopted a similar product.285 The importance of this case in the 
UK is somewhat confusing as it is unclear whether the decision would have been the same 
after the European test of "the author's own intellectual creation," which encompasses the 
questions of whether the choices were made by the coupon authors, whether there was a 
creative element and whether the author embodied his personality.286 Landbroke v William 
Hill also discussed the components of the “sweat of the brow” standard. According to the 
standard of originality defended in the mentioned cases, the principal component of 
originality is labor. Thus, any original work created because of a person's effort and labor is 
protected. A work is considered original, as long as it is not be copied and originates from 
the author. 
However, more recent cases have prompted a revision of the originality standard. In the 
field of software, in Nova Productions Ltd. v Mazooma Games Ltd, resolving a conflict 
between two creators of electronic pool games. The UK Royal Court attributed authorship 
to the creator of the elements of the infringed video game. In the Temple Island Collections 
Ltd. v New English Teas Ltd. Case, Nicholas John Houghton sued the latter company over 
alleged copyright infringement of a black and white photograph of the Houses of 
Parliament with a red London bus in the foreground. The judge ultimately determined that 
copyright is infringed when someone reproduces not only the whole, but also a substantial 
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The American Copyright Act is the only statutory source of copyright protection in the 
country.287 This law has been modified multiple times to adapt to changes in technology 
and telecommunication and provide for works on the Internet, sound recordings and their 
digital use,288 computer programs, and databases. In the case of AI generated derivative 
works, it enshrines the assumption that the copyright holder is the programmer. This 
copyright entails a non-exclusive right of use over the work and grants external users 
license to use the program. Furthermore, the Final Report of the National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works determines that the user of the program 
can hold the status of author. As the ownership rights of both programmer and user are 
legally protected, there is a possibility of co-authorship in this context.  
The problem with this legislation is that it only regulates works created by people who used 
software as an instrument: the law does not discuss creations made autonomously made by 
AI. This is because the US does not accept the notion of a non-human author. On this topic, 
Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices Section 503.03(a) states: 
“Works-not originated by a human author. 
In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work must be the product of human 
authorship. Works produced by mechanical processes or random selection without 
any contribution by a human author are not registrable. Thus, a linoleum floor 
covering featuring a multicolored pebble design which was produced by a 
mechanical process in unrepeatable, random patterns, is not registrable. Similarly, a 
work owing its form to the forces of nature and lacking human authorship is not 
registrable; thus, for example, a piece of driftwood even if polished and mounted is 
not registrable.” 
In the US, the Copyright Office requires protectable works to be created by human authors. 
AI-generated works are not copyrightable, although they fulfill the requisite of originality 
and are creative works.289 The compendium of best practices indicates that “(The office) 
will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates 
randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human 
author.”290 Thus, the US, by denying the allocation of copyright to non-human authors, 
will place AI-generated works automatically in the public domain.291 
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It can be interpreted from the U.S. Copyright Act that the generative software developer is 
the copyright owner of the software.292 However, it is not clear whether the programmer 
has any legal copyright on the works produced autonomously and independently by the 
software. There is an issue because copyright law has not adapted its model of authorship 




The American debated surrounding the topic of copyright has centered on the issues of 
originality and creativity.294 In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony,295 the Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of extending copyright protection to mechanically 
reproduced photographs, without the requirements of originality and creativity stipulated in 
the Trade-Mark cases of 1879.296 Burrow-Giles argued that Napoleon Sarony’s photograph 
of Oscar Wilde was, therefore, not the original production of the author. Following this 
ruling, the Supreme Court defined authorship and copyright in broadly humanistic terms. 
The author is presented as “he to whom anything owes it origin; originator; maker; one who 
completes a work of science or literature;” copyright is “the exclusive right of a man to the 
production of his own genius or intellect.” The Court concluded that authorship can also be 
understood in terms of causation: the author is “the cause of the picture” and “the man 
who…gives effect to the idea, fancy, or imagination.” It means, the person who takes the 
photograph should make a creative composition and the camera is a mere instrument.297 
 
A number of later works further developed these concepts. In Baltimore Orioles v MLB 
Players Association, the 7th Circuit court found that “(a) work is original if it is the 
independent creation of its author. A work is creative if it embodies some modest amount 
of intellectual labor.”  Furthermore, in Andrien v S. Ocean County Chamber of Commerce 
and Lindsay v Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic, American courts ruled that 
printers whose activities give concrete form to clients’ conceptions are not the authors of 
the resulting works, because they have in no way “intellectually modified or mechanically 
enhanced the concept articulated by [the client], other than to arrange it in a form that could 
be photographed as part of the [printing] process.”298  
 
A key case in the development of American copyright law is Bleistein v Donaldson 
Lithographing Co. In its ruling, Judge Holmes based his conception of authorship on 
human personalities, moving away from the US approach to the development of creativity 
and originality by stating that “The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon 
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nature. Personality always contains something unique…something irreducible, which is one 
man’s alone. That something he may copyright.”299 
 
 Feist Publications Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co. is possibly the most important case 
regarding copyright allocation in the US. It presents a threshold of creativity and proposes a 
“test of originality”: these policies have become a constitutional requirement for obtaining 
copyright protections.300 In Feist v Rural Telephone, the US Supreme Court also 
emphasizes that “copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess 
more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.”301 More than 550 lower court decisions 
have discussed or applied the Feist criterion of originality since the decision302 and most 
copyrighted works have no difficulty in meeting its threshold in the Feist originality test.303   
 
Slater v Naruto monkey is a famous copyright case that addresses a work produced by a 
non-human. In this case, an Indonesian monkey named Naruto took a photograph of itself 
with the camera of a professional British photographer, David Slater. Wikipedia Commons 
posted the image, tagging it belonging to the public domain: this prompted a dispute 
between Slater and Wikipedia. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals also demanded 
that copyright be granted to the monkey. Ultimately, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit decided not to attribute author’s rights to the monkey or David Slater. Instead, the 
photograph was determined to be public domain. In the Naruto case, most of legal analysis 
has focused on US law.304 The US Copyright Office weighed in, using the “photograph 
taken by a monkey”305 to demonstrate that animals cannot produce copyrightable works. 
However, Slater has British nationality and the photo was taken in Indonesia, thus, US 
copyright law should not have prevailed.306 
 
There are two significant cases that highlight the process software copyright allocation: 
Atari Inc. v North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., revolving around the famous 
“Pac-Man” game and Williams Elec. Inc. v Arctic Int’l. Inc, concerning the game 
“Defender.” Contrary to the then conventional legal considerations, in which copyright is 
lead to the public domain, U.S. courts ruled that the copyright in the images and screens of 
the disputed game must be granted to the copyright owner of the software. The 
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While the EU has increasingly harmonized copyright laws across its member states in the 
last 25 years,308 the European acquis communautaire309 does not cover all areas of 
copyright law.310 There are no community-wide copyright laws, and only the exceptions 
and limitations to copyright and related rights are harmonized across the Union. This is due 
to the fact that, The EU does not have direct jurisdiction in the field of copyright due to the 
principle of territoriality, whereby each member state has its own laws. However, the EU 
produces Directives311 to execute the provisions of the EC Treaty312 through which it 
regulates matters of free market for goods and services.313 
 
The EU has tried to integrate the treatment to property protection, including intellectual 
property, in the Directive 2001/29/EC. This directive tries to harmonize certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information technology sector. However, it does not 
contemplate requirements for copyrightability of works, such as the level of creativity or 
the human element. 
The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (EU Copyright Directive) intends 
to harmonize further aspects of European Union copyright law contribute to the functioning 
of the internal market, ensure a high level of protection for rights holders, and facilitate the 
clearance of rights. The proposal is based on and complements the rules laid down in 
Directive 96/9/EC, Directive 2001/29/EC, Directive 2006/115/E, Directive 2009/24/EC, 
Directive 2012/28/EU, Directive 2014/26/EU, and Directive 2010/13/EU.314  
The directive was approved by the European Parliament on September 12, 2018 and is due 
to be discussed by the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of 
the European Union. At the end of the process, the Directive will either be approved in its 
totality or rejected. 
Existing EU copyright law primarily consists of eight Directives. Only the Computer 
Programs Directive 1991 (CPD), the Database Directive 1996, the Information Society 
Directive (InfoSocD), and the Orphan Works Directive are relevant to the current study.  
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The InfoSocD is meant to implement the WCT and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The Preamble of the InFoSocD considers amongst other 
things that copyright stimulates the development and commercialization of products and 
services, as well as the exploitation of their creative components. It also considers that the 
current legislation on copyright needs to be adapted in order to respond adequately to 
economic changes, without the need to add new concepts for the protection of intellectual 
property.315  
 
The European copyright framework currently only covers innovation and human creativity. 
Therefore, while technological advances allow the creation of AI-generated works, the 
copyright rights of these works are unprotected. For this reason, various EU institutions 
have addressed the necessity of clarifying the legal implications of AI developments. The 
Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament published in May 2016 a draft report 
with recommendations to the Civil Law Standards Committee on Robotics, stating that 
“Robotics and AI have become one of the most prominent technological trends of our 
century. The fast increase of their use and development brings new and difficult challenges 
to our society” and also that “It is crucial that regulation provides predictable and 
sufficiently clear conditions to incentivize European innovation in the area of robotics and 
AI.”316  
 
In February 2017, the European Parliament adopted a motion calling on the European 
Commission to develop civil laws related to robotics and AI. This resolution recognizes 
intellectual property as one of the relevant areas of law in this context.317 It notes that there 
is no legal provision that specifically applies to robotics, but that the doctrines and legal 
regimes in force can easily be applied to this field. However, certain aspects require special 
consideration, and the motion therefore suggests that the European Commission should 
elaborate criteria for “own intellectual creation” applicable to copyrightable works created 
by computers or robots.318 
 
The Commission should examine how to balance intellectual property rights applied to 
hardware and software standards, stimulating innovation; proposing scenarios that address 
issues such as autonomous and own intellectual creation and issues of authorship and 
ownership of works created or generated by or involving computers or robots.319 In light of 
rapid advancements in AI, EU legislation faces civil law challenge.320 This thesis seeks to 
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Since no EU Directive has established a general standard for originality that is applicable to 
all copyrightable works, the ECJ has begun to harmonize the originality requirements 
through judicial interpretation in recent years .321  
In Infopaq v Danske Dagblades, the Danish press clipping service Infopaq International and 
the Danish Newspaper Association had a dispute over the reproduction of press clippings 
sold to the clients. The clipping process involved data capture and consisted of scanning 
images of the original articles, translating these images into text, and creating 11-word 
snippets. The court had to determine whether the degree of originality of the snippets was 
sufficient, since the process was highly mechanized, and it was decided that the definition 
of originality should contain the “author’s own intellectual creation,”  meaning it had to 
rule in favor of granting copyright to the work.322 This case uses the aforementioned 
Directive 2001/29/EC. Based on this decision, the CJEU achieved full harmonization of the 
originality requirement at the EU level. The originality requirement now refers to the 
“author’s own intellectual creation”323 across the EU. Although Infopaq could be 
considered to apply to literary works and the disposition of fragments, in the case of BSA v 
Ministry of Culture, the CJEU applied the decision to other works, granting copyright to a 
graphical user interface in a computer program.324 
Later cases in the ECJ’s attempts to harmonize originality standards include a decision 
concerning the copyrightability of a news clipping service (case C-393/09 Bezpečnostní 
softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany) and a case addressing the broadcasting 
rights for sporting events (joint cases Football Association Premier League Ltd and other v 
QC Leisure and other (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-
429/08)). The originality criterion was further clarified in Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd, where the European Court of Justice considered that copyright could not be 
claimed for a sporting event per se because “an ‘author’s own intellectual creation’ 
involves that the process must leave room for “creative freedom for the purposes of 
copyright.”325 
In the case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH and Others, the court 
confirmed the Infopaq judgment, proposing a useful set of rules: the copyright of a 
photograph should be granted if “the author was able to express his creative abilities in the 
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production of the work by making free and creative choices.”326 This decision indicates that 
an intellectual creation should reflect the author´s personality; his capacity to express his 
creative ability requires him to make free and creative choices.327 
 
In conclusion, within the framework of the current case law of the European Court of 
Justice, the system of European copyright law, its foundation and the legal literature 
supporting it, copyright cannot be claimed in the case of AI-generated works. Up until now, 
even if it is an outstanding achievement and the creation of the AI is considered to be 







As a member of the European Union, Germany implements the EU Directives regarding 
copyright.328 On an internal level, German copyright is codified by the rules laid out in the 
UrhG.329 The UrhG provides an open-ended list in Article 2 (1), which creates few 
problems with regard to protecting unconventional works via copyright law.330 However, 
the same article establishes that only the author’s personal intellectual creations constitutes 
works: this could exclude AI copyright ownership due to ontological considerations about 




Previously, German courts demanded a substantial degree of originality in the applied 
works of art. Only if the artistic quality was superior to standards of the typical designer, 
the work could be subject to copyright protection. In the Geburtstagszug (Birthday Train) 
case, the plaintiff, a toy designer, sued a salesman and toy manufacturer, arguing that his 
creation (the train) should receive a higher remuneration for copyright. The applicant was 
unsuccessful at first instance and on appeal, as the designs of the toys did not meet the 
requirements for copyrighted works of art. However, the Federal Supreme Court allowed 
the appeal and granted the right. 
 
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof) abandoned the previous line 
of case law concerning the requirements for protection of industrial designs under 
intellectual property law, arguing that Directive 98/71/EC abandons the distinction between 
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applied works of art and non-profit works of art. This Directive was implemented in 2004 






Copyright in Colombia is regulated principally by Law No. 23 of 1982 on author´s 
rights.332 It is also impacted by the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, the TRIPS 
agreement, the Universal Declaration of Human rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Law No. 1450 of 2011, Law No. 1753 of 2015, Law 
No. 44 of 1993, Law No. 1915 of 2018, and the modificatory Law No. 44 of 1993. Law No. 
23 of 1982 grants copyright ownership to “the author of the work.” The law also specifies 
that the owner represents the human person,333 and the work must be "a creation of his 
spirit.” In addition, the Andean decision 351 expressly states that the author is a natural 
person who performs the intellectual creation,334 and the Colombian Copyright Center 
prescribes that a work is all human expression product of ingenuity and talent. 
 
In July 2018, Law No. 1915 of 2018 was adopted, modifying the earlier Law No. 23. This 
law was initially proposed as a mechanism to comply with the Free Trade Agreement 
signed between Colombia and the USA,335 but a number of elements not included in the 
original trade agreement were later added. The law introduces aspects that were already in 
force in the national territory by the Andean Decision 351 of 1993, and because these 
aspects correspond to commitments acquired by the country in the WIPO Treaty. Although 
the law came into force recently, it does not regulate or even contemplate computer 




Colombia is a country in which AI is growing. Although Colombian legal scholars have 
investigated foreign regulations and doctrine that focus on the copyrightability of AI 
generated works, to date there has been no legal specific discussion of the issue internally, 
and no cases have been filed. However, in the judgment on constitutionality C-276/96 
brought by Maria Teresa Garcés Lloreda, suing art. 20, 81 and 98 of Law No. 23 of 1982, 
the Court considered granting authorship to non-human authors, specifically to legal 
persons, and to natural persons who did not directly create the work, by stating that “the 
general principle recognizes as author the natural person who creates the work, to which the 
original ownership of the work is attributed; starting from this presupposition, legal 
persons, since they lack creative capacity, cannot be original owners of the copyright 
derived from them, which is different from the natural persons that constitute them. 
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However, legal persons and some natural persons who do not participate in the creative act 
may be recognized as holders of the copyright of a work.”336 This decision could apply to 
AI generated-works for granting copyright either to the programmer (in case of natural 
persons without direct intervention in the creative process) or to the algorithm (in the 
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The central question in the present thesis was how to fairly regulate the copyright of AI 
generated works, when a human element is traditionally necessary. Allocating copyright to 
AI-generated works is a modern challenge faced by legal systems around the world. The 
historical overview in this thesis revealed that Copyright law has evolved from the first 
known dispute, in which copyright protected the copying of books, to the protection of 
publishers and booksellers in the 17th century, after the invention of the printing press, to 
the romantic discourse of the right of author in Europe in the 18th  century, and the 
protection of the authors´ rights in the Statute of Anne. The scientific and academic 
community has come to recognize the creative potential of AI, and they have begun to 
request that it be legally regulated. It was from the Feudal Regime in Venice that copyright 
was gradually protected as inherent to the human being, until its protection as a property 
right in the statute of Anne. Finally, in the 18th century the conception of the romantic 
author began and is still valid. The romantic author supposes that the author is a creative 
being, and therefore, to this day, human being is an implication to have the possibility that 
the works are copyrightable.   Analyzing the required human element revealed that it is not 
specifically the human being that is asked for, but the attribute of creativity, a feature that 
has long been considered exclusively human. Even in the first definitions of AI, it tries to 
explain its creative capacity, comparing it with the human being, classifying the concept in 
"thinking humanly" and "acting humanly. However, it is currently considered that 
algorithms can work with creativity, which means that this is a time of possible change in 
copyright regulation. 
 
For this reason, it was analyzed how AI works and it was found that the academic 
community, based on scientific postulates and without furthering a philosophical meaning, 
considers that the different types of AI work in an unpredictable and autonomous way using 
algorithmic creativity so that their works are novel and original reasons why their works 
meet the requirements to be considered creative works. For example, Kalin Hristov affirms 
that “since only the authors of creative works may enjoy ‘authorship,’ it should be 
redefined to include both human and non-humans’ authors,”337and authors such as Colin R. 
Davies and Ryan Abbott have claimed that authorship can be recognized to computers 
under current legislation.338 
 
Thus, it seems that machines should be able to hold copyright, since they can comply with 
all the established requirements of creativity and originality. The issue then becomes how 
to exercise these rights, since machines are neither natural or juridical persons. One 
possibility is that the works remain in the public domain. However, considering that 
copyright and intellectual property laws seek to recognize the work of the author and 
encourage innovation, the option of granting copyright to machines seems 
counterproductive: machines cannot be incentivized with economic compensation, and 
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recognizing their contributions does not encourage a creative spirit. The way AI works is 
linked to how it has been programmed and used. 
 
The analysis of other possible ownership theories is necessary, such as the different 
categories proposed, the role of the user in the performance of the AI, the role of the 
companies, the joint authorship and the intervention of the programmer as the main source 
of effort and to whom the existence of the AI is owed and finally, the final work.  Other 
areas of study, such as computer science, are important to obtaining a better, more complete 
understanding of the functioning of AI. These fields can serve as a basis for the 
comprehension of the scientific and economic scope of this domain and its relationship 
with copyright law. 
 
Legal systems based on common and civil law and reveal that although there is no perfect 
clarity as to who owns the copyright in AI creations. Nevertheless, the current laws and 
regulations can be interpreted in such a way as to answer this question. This legal 
development is pioneered by the UK, which has acknowledged the existence of works 
exclusively generated by computer in its legislation. The CDPA has established a system 
for granting the copyright of this type of work to the person “by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.”339 
 
Because of the contribution of programmers in creating the AI, this thesis concludes that 
they are the ones to whom the copyright should be granted. In addition, the programmer 
can be encouraged by the recognition of his authorship and financial benefits, thus fulfilling 
one of the key purposes of copyright protection. However, the problem with this solution is 
that, although the AI owes its existence to the programmer, he does not directly create the 
final product. This could cause future problems in allocating copyright, when for example 
the programmer is also an AI. In the future there needs to be a discussion about the 
continuity of granting these rights, which considers awarding the programmer for the 
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